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Abstract 
 
The paper proposes a brief overview of tendencies in pragmatics (evo-
lution of sign perception as a dyadic::triadic::quadratic entity; its 
interpretation not as a static, but dynamic, discourse bound phe-
nomenon, analysis of Peirce’s views on sources of rational explana-
tion), paying major attention to Apel’s distinctive philosophical ap-
proach, known as transcendental pragmatics, its congeniality with 
general principles of hermeneutics and potentials of its application in 
linguistics. 
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Zastosowanie hermeneutyki  
i transcendentalnej pragmatyki w językoznawstwie 
 
Abstrakt 
 
Artykuł proponuje krótki przegląd tendencji w pragmatyce (ewolucja 
postrzegania znaków jako bytu podwójnego :: potrójnego :: poczwór-
nego; jego interpretacja nie jest zjawiskiem statycznym, ale dyna-
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micznym, dyskursywnym; analiza poglądów Peirce’a na źródła rac-
jonalnego wyjaśnienia), zwracając szczególną uwagę na wyróżniające 
się podejście filozoficzne Apela, znane jako pragmatyka transcenden-
talna, jego zgodność z ogólnymi zasadami hermeneutyki oraz po-
tencjał jego zastosowania w językoznawstwie. 
 
Słowa kluczowe 
 
hermeneutyka, pragmatyka, znak, simulakry, transcendentalna 
gramatyka 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
A number of scholars argue that certain branches of linguis-
tics are hermeneutical by their nature. Rennie (2012: 385), for 
instance, claims that in qualitative linguistic research and dis-
course studies, the method of hermeneutic circle is implicitly 
applied to educe and articulate meaning of the text. Further-
more, Sanders (2005: 57) names a number of areas of qualita-
tive linguistics he considers to be hermeneutical by the meth-
odology of use, e.g. 
 
applied linguistics and sociolinguistics, argumentation studies, 
conversation analysis, discourse analysis, discursive psychology, 
ethnography of communication, language pragmatics, rhetorical 
communication and semiotics. 
 
In this paper, I will demonstrate that hermeneutics and tran-
scendental pragmatics are not only applied in certain fields of 
linguistics, but provide access to understanding the grammati-
cal structure of language in general, being constituent parts of 
contemporary linguistic analysis. 
  
2.  Language as a societally created semiotic system 
 
Viewing language as a product of society lies at the core of in-
terpretation of any linguistic phenomenon. Hjelmslev (1969: 3) 
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insists that  
 
language is the instrument with which man forms thought and 
feeling, mood, aspiration, will and act, the instrument by whose-
means he influences and is influenced, the ultimate and deepest 
foundation of human society.  
 
Being a social phenomenon, language differs from other social 
institutions as it is a system of communication and, in par-
ticular, a system of signs. It constitutes itself as the central 
part of “a science that studies the life of signs within society” 
(Saussure 1966: 16), i.e. “semiology” in Saussure’s terms. 
This view is shared by many scholars. As stated by Panther 
and Thornburg (2009: 3),  
 
human languages are semiotic systems in which forms are con-
ventionally paired with meanings […] The semiotic character of 
language holds not only for individual lexemes but also for gram-
matical constructions, which code more or less abstract (schemat-
ic) contents and communicative functions. 
 
Language, however, should not be confused with speech. 
Saussure’s differentiation of these two notions lies in the very 
definition of speech as an individual act of will and mind. 
Within this act it is important to distinguish between: “(1) the 
combinations by which the speaker uses the language code for 
expressing his own thought; and (2) the psychophysical mech-
anism that allows him to exteriorize those combinations” 
(Saussure 1966: 14). 
It brings us to the problem of the difference between two 
distinct modes experiencing language. Language is a semiotic 
system, legacy of the many, which functions on the basis of 
grammatical rules, shared and recognized by everyone. 
Speech, in turn, is individual, subjective and flexible, it is the 
way language is used. 
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3.  Interpretation of grammar and individual use  
of language 
 
Grammar itself can be compared to a game. They are both rep-
resented by a set of rules. A game is “a transformation system 
of essentially the same structure as a semiotic” (Hjelmslev 
1969: 110), with the exception that the rules of a game are 
syncretic by their structure, i.e. their meaning and form coin-
cide and consequently do not require interpretation. On the 
contrary, linguistic signs which constitute any language 
demonstrate a dichotomy between the expression-form and the 
content-form. The meaning which defines them needs to be 
construed via interpretation. Grammar, as a set of rules, can-
not be perceived. This very fact limits our capacity to interpret 
it. 
Similar views were expressed by Schleiermacher (1998), 
who distinguished between a “grammatical” treating of a lan-
guage as a semiotic system functioning on the basis of rules, 
i.e. grammar, and technical interpretation dealing with speech 
produced by an individual, i.e. use of language.  Ricoeur 
(1981: 47) considers grammatical interpretation to be “objec-
tive”, and technical or psychological interpretation to be “posi-
tive”, “because it reaches the act of thought, which produced 
the discourse”. Therefore, psychological interpretation can be 
achieved by means of empathy, given the empirical accessibil-
ity of speech. Language as a socially construed semiotic sys-
tem lies outside of subjective experience and, consequently, 
cannot be analyzed through empathy only. Grammar, as a set 
of rules, governs the way linguistic signs function within a se-
miotic system called language. The starting point of under-
standing grammar lies in understanding linguistic signs. 
  
4.  Static vs. dynamic modes of sign perception 
 
Primarily linguistic signs were interpreted as static entities. 
Saussure offered a dyadic sign model, accentuating a non-
motivated nature of a linguistic sign, which consists of “a con-
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cept and a sound image” (Saussure 1966: 66). This model was 
later substituted by theories about the triadic structure of lin-
guistic signs. 
The problem is that languages differ from genuine conven-
tion based sign-systems, in which the structure “mean-
ing=form” is isomorphic. 
According to Peirce (1994 [1932]: 2.228), “A sign, or repre-
sentamen, is something which stands to somebody for some-
thing in some respect or capacity”. Peirce introduces a triadic 
structure of a linguistic sign, which consist of three intercon-
nected parts: an object, a representamen and an interpretant. 
Thus, the process of signification, i.e. semiosis, is not merely 
constituted by a dyadic relationship between a sign and an 
object it stands for. The essence of semiosis lies in correspond-
ence between an object and its mental representation. 
Following Peirce’s ideas, Morris proposes four elements of 
semiosis: sign vehicle, designatum, and interpretant and in-
terpreter. “The mediators are sign vehicles; the taking-
account-of are interpretants; the agents of the process are in-
terpreters; what is taken-account-of are designate” (Morris 
1971: 19). 
  
5.  Discourse and culturally bound interpretation  
of linguistic signs 
 
Except for being dynamic entities, linguistic signs should be 
interpreted inseparably from the discourse. It is widely accept-
ed by cognitive linguists that “meanings of the parts of a con-
struction contribute to the meaning of the whole, but the 
meaning of the whole is often unpredictable, but holistic and 
idiomatic” (Panther and Thornburg 2009: 3). Sentences are 
used as a totality in order to express a complete thought (Ros-
si-Landi 1983: 129). 
Taken separately from the system, signs are interpreted on 
the basis of their connection with the signified or their influ-
ence on the interpreter. It is more worthwhile, however, taking 
into consideration their connections with other signs depend-
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ing on the dynamics of semiotic system in which they function. 
Signs gain additional qualities determined by their place and 
value within this system. 
The central standpoint of Phenomenological Hermeneutics 
(Gadamer, Heidegger, Husserl) is that human reality is con-
strued by meanings, which are ways of making sense of reali-
ty. Meanings form intersubjective culturally and socially con-
stituted systems. According to Heidegger, description is always 
already interpretation. Every form of human awareness is in-
terpretive and language serves as a means of reaching under-
standing (Heidegger 1996). 
For Husserl (1967), the central idea behind “intersubjectivi-
ty” stipulates that the meaning of any phenomenon is built on 
the basis of personal or subjective experience of several sub-
jects. Empathy gives access to representations of objects 
formed in the consciousness of other people. This psychologi-
cal process involves perceiving another person’s experience 
with one’s own mind. Correspondingly, the meaning can be 
construed only if intersubjective representations coincide. If 
these representations coincide, they exist independently from 
single person’s consciousness. If they exist beyond empirical 
perception of one subject, they belong to the world of objective 
phenomena. 
Gadamer, in turn, claims that understanding does not come 
from perceiving subjective experience of another person, but 
“language is the universal medium in which understanding 
occurs. Understanding occurs in interpreting” (Gadamer 2004: 
390). The process of transforming concepts and intentions into 
an abstract language of signs causes alienation between a sign 
and its meaning. This alienation can be overcome only in in-
terpretation. Understanding lies at the core of interpretation. 
Subsequently, the hermeneutical task lies in “coming to  
a proper understanding about the subject matter, which takes 
place in the medium of language” (Gadamer 2004: 387). The 
meaning of a linguistic sign is construed as a result of reach-
ing an agreement about similarities between intersubjective 
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representations of one and the same phenomenon existing in 
the mind of others. 
Arguing against purely structural interpretation of linguistic 
signs, Ricoeur defined the hermeneutic task in construing 
meaning through culturally bound discourse. Interpretation of 
any text should be situated outside the immanence of lan-
guage. In his own words, the claim is illustrated as follows: 
 
There is no reference problem in language: signs refer to other 
signs within the same system. In the phenomenon of the sen-
tence, language passes outside itself; reference is the mark of the 
self-transcendence of language (Ricoeur 1979: 74). 
 
Smith (1997: 17)sums up the above-said in the way that in 
contemporary discourse, interpretation is the only way to gain 
knowledge, it is the main means of demonstrating the impos-
sibility of a culturally transcendent discourse. 
The process of accessing language starts with understand-
ing that it is a semiotic system constituted by linguistic signs, 
the meaning of which is dynamic and culturally bound. Lan-
guage itself has evolved in society and for it to be able to per-
form its primary function, i.e. to communicate thoughts and 
intentions from one subject to another, the meanings have to 
be conventional and recognizes by others. Signs, however, in-
teract with other signs and change over time. They also de-
pend on context, which provides them with additional shades 
of meaning. As a result, for the meaning to be retrieved we 
need to rely on empathy. Itkonen (2004) characterizes empathy 
as a method of reaching rational explanation, which is based 
on iconicity. Iconicity, respectively, is understood as similarity, 
a “picture-like” relationship between extra-linguistic reality 
and language (Itkonen 2004: 21). For him, conventionalized 
empathy is intuition (Itkonen 2008). It is the fundamental 
point of understanding any linguistic activity. Access to mean-
ing is provided by “the native speaker’s linguistic intuition” 
(Itkonen 1978: 56). Speakers elicit the meaning of linguistic 
signs relying on their own intuition. Although the process of 
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understanding largely depends on individual consciousness of 
people, interpretation happens only in comparison of intersub-
jective representations of objects. For Bergson (1912), intellec-
tual effort is a prerequisite of interpretation. With its help, one 
can unveil the meaning which lies at the core of iconic sign 
transformations. Intellectual effort is based on intuition, the 
latter can be characterized as “the kind of intellectual sympa-
thy by which one places oneself within an object in order to 
coincide with what is unique in itself and consequently inex-
pressible” (Bergson 1912: 7). Bergson (1920: 196-199) intro-
duces a notion of a “dynamic scheme”, which means an ab-
stract idea containing all the images, in the estate of reciprocal 
implications with the proper function they perform as a whole. 
Unfortunately, linguistic signs being inherently dynamic re-
main a thing-in-itself. In a certain sense, their meaning being 
fluid and changeable is impossible to capture. Proper under-
standing is possible only as tracing iconic sign transformations 
from perception to interpretation (Peirce 1994 [1932]: 2.141-
142). Such intellectual empathy or intuition mediates percep-
tion and reasoning in order to gain objective knowledge about 
linguistic phenomena. 
Eco (2000: 13-14) expresses an idea that we produce signs 
in order to articulate meaning. The dynamic nature of linguis-
tic signs, however, turns semiosis into an endless process of 
interpretation. The concept of “unlimited semiosis” enables the 
semiotic system to recheck itself entirely using its own means 
(Eco 1979: 68). This term refers to interpretation as a se-
quence of interpretants, when the signified is functioning as  
a signifier for a further signified, and is endlessly reproduced. 
  
6.  Problem of infinite sign transformation  
and formation of simulacra 
 
Contrary to the structural approach (Saussure), to the inter-
pretation of a linguistic sign as immanent and autonomous to 
extralinguistic reality, the post-structural approach (Baud-
rillard, Deleuze, Guattari, Derrida) further developed the per-
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ception of a linguistic sign as an ontologically, pragmatically 
and semiotically determined phenomenon, which is defined by 
the object of its representation, subject and method. 
The attempts to reconsider the nonlinear mode of thinking 
and the dynamic character of signs have brought to light the 
problem of transformation of signs into simulacra (Baudrillard 
1994), rhizomaticity of their meaning (Deleuze-Guattari 2005) 
and impossibility of their analysis without deconstruction 
(Derrida 2001). 
Bloomfield (1933: 74-75) depicts the problematic nature of 
contemporary linguistic discourse in the following statement: 
“Our knowledge of the world in which we live is so imperfect 
that we can rarely make accurate statements about the mean-
ing of a speech-form”. 
Unfortunately, neither intersubjectivity nor unlimited semi-
osis are capable of grasping the meaning of a linguistic signs 
which has undergone numerous transformations and is on the 
way of becoming a simulacrum. 
According to Marcuse (2002: 17), in contemporary society 
mass behaviorism causes “habit of thoughts”. Such state of 
affairs produces a one-dimensional man, who mainly mechan-
ically responds to stimuli. “Transcendence” (Marcuse 2002: 17, 
77, 175) liberates the individual from the predominant one 
dimensionality, it implies an act of will which overcomes the 
behaviorist way of thinking.   
All these terms, e.g., transcendence, conventionalized empa-
thy, intuition and intellectual effort, are different names of one 
and the same concept. They all represent a certain act of will 
performed by a thinking individual directed at conceiving the 
meaning of linguistic signs. In order to achieve this goal, one 
should follow the logic of iconicity of sign transformation 
through the process of its existence.  Iconic sign transfor-
mation can only be traced in interpretation of intersubjective 
representations that exist in the mind of others. 
Unfortunately, the fetish character of communication leads 
to unification and depersonalization. Rossi-Landi (1983: 77) 
claims that at a certain point in time, the production and ex-
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change of words and phrases become regular and systematic. 
The mechanical nature of communication transforms signs 
into simulacra, which “take on the appearance of autonomous 
existence” (Rossi-Landi 1983: 77). 
Any sign can potentially turn into a simulacrum due to its 
dynamic nature and capacity to be endlessly commutable. Ac-
cording to Derrida, the very essence of signs lies in their ability 
of being repeated.  
 
A sign which does not repeat itself, which is not already divided by 
repetition in its “first time,” is not a sign. The signifying referral 
therefore must be ideal—and ideality is but the assured power of 
repetition—in order to refer to the same thing each time (Derrida 
2001: 310). 
  
7.  Transcendental Pragmatics as key to interpretation  
of linguistic signs as dynamic entities 
 
Apel (1994: 78) introduced the concept “transcendental semi-
otics”, which combines transcendental pragmatics and herme-
neutics. This approach is designed to provide access to under-
standing of meaning. The meaning itself embraces three key 
elements, e.g., “subjective intention, linguistic convention and 
reference to things” (Apel 1994: 78). None of these constituent 
parts is hierarchically superior to the other two. They are 
equally important in “understanding and explicating the 
meaning of utterances or of written texts” (Apel 1994: 78).  
Boersema (2009: 143), analyzing Apel’s ideas, emphasizes that 
in the process of interpretation and articulation of meaning, 
these key elements complement and restrict each other and 
serve as “regulative principles of inquiry”. 
In order to grasp the meaning of signs in dynamics, Peirce’s 
focus on their triadic structure is insufficient, the introduction 
of the fourth element represented by the “communicative 
community” is essential. Apel’s methodology transcends the 
interpretation of meaning by the cognizing subject beyond in-
dividual consciousness of one single person. Understanding, 
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from his perspective, is achieved by the transcendental sub-
ject, represented by a linguistic community, all members of 
which are involved in the act of communication and contribute 
to the process of reaching a consensus.  Each member of this 
community “converts its understanding of symbols into real 
operative rules of behavior or habits” (Apel 1981: 29). Inter-
subjective communication between these subjects is not simp-
ly information exchange. It involves them in a language-game 
which, from a semanto-pragmatic perspective, is a prerequisite 
of reaching an agreement about the meaning of linguistic 
signs. What is more, intersubjective communication also reas-
sures an argumentative discourse. Within the pragmatic di-
mension of this process, all the participants of language-games 
must be taken into account in “a very striking, anthropologi-
cally and socio-comprehensible sense as the precondition of 
the possibility for the perspectivistic interpretation of reality 
‘as something’” (Apel 1980: 99). 
With Peirce and others, Apel claims to have “fallen back up-
on the normative conception of an ideal consensus to be estab-
lished within an ideal and unlimited communicative communi-
ty” (Apel 1998: 151). In other words, all rule-following rotates 
around an ideal of reaching a consensus, which is designated 
to regulate the way language as a semiotic system functions. 
This leads Habermas to claim: A sign can fulfill its repre-
sentative function only if, along with the relation to the objec-
tive world of entities, it simultaneously establishes a relation 
to the intersubjective world of interpreters” (Habermas 1992: 
101). He argued that speech acts constitute a communicative 
practice, which is “oriented to achieving, sustaining, renewing 
consensus” (Habermas 1984: 17). The rationality of communi-
cative practice is based on the consensus, achieved by inter-
subjective agreement. This definition implies the recognition  
of language as a social phenomenon, which is inherently ra-
tional. 
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8.  Conclusions 
 
Conventional nature of language makes its interpretation pos-
sible. According to Langacker (1987: 27), “speakers clearly 
have some conception of what does or does not accord with 
linguistic convention”, i.e. “usage” can be interpreted as nor-
matively sanctioned use (convention). Therefore, access to un-
derstanding grammatical structures is provided by native 
speakers’ intuition. By employing Apel’s concept of a linguistic 
community as a Transcendental Subject, it is possible to con-
strue an image of an ideal respondent, providing the interpret-
er with objective knowledge about the meaning of a linguistic 
sign and a speech-form accordingly. Modern linguistics has 
been doing so, most probably unconsciously, by using multiple 
respondents in experimental studies. Statistical analysis of the 
totality of their answers helps researchers to reveal the con-
ventional use of grammatical forms and unveil general gram-
matical principles. 
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